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Introduction: 
During the summer of 2013, Democrat Bill de Blasio launched his campaign for 
New York City Mayor. His platform relied heavily on the promise to end the New York 
Police Department’s controversial “Stop, Question and Frisk” policy, commonly known 
as “stop-and-frisk.” Stop-and-frisk occurs when a police officer stops a citizen on the 
street, questions that person, and, if the officer deems it necessary, frisks the individual 
with the intention of recovering contraband. Like other “hot spot” policing tactics, it 
encourages officers to focus on small geographic areas where crime is most 
concentrated.1 
While not without its defenders, the policy has been widely criticized for being 
racially discriminatory by scholars, politicians, media pundits, and others. Those arguing 
in favor of stop-and-frisk believe that the tactic reduces the rate of murders and other 
violent crimes, and were alarmed when de Blasio took office in 2014 and made good on 
his campaign promise.2 In his first year as Mayor, the number of stops conducted by the 
NYPD fell by 75.9% as compared to the previous year.3 During this same period, the 
homicide rate decrease slightly by .6%, from 335 to 333—the lowest rate in the city’s 
history—disproving the notion that the policy curbs violent criminal behavior.4 At the 
                                                 
1 United States. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 
La Vigne, Nancy G., Pamela Lachman, Shebani Rao, and Andrea Matthews. Stop and 
Frisk: Balancing Crime Control with Community Relations. (2014): 3. Web. 
2 Grynbaum, Michael M. “Taking Office, de Blasio Vows to Fix Inequality.” New York 
Times 1 January 2014. Web. 
3 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Stop, Question, and frisk 
Report Database. New York: 2015. Web. 
4 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Historical New York City 
Crime Data. New York: 2015. Web. 
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close of his first year in office, Mayor de Blasio touted the success of his administration’s 
reform, saying, “Now we know that the broken policy of stop-and-frisk is in the past.”5 
However, during the first two months of 2015, the homicide rate in New York 
City spiked by 20% as compared to the same period in the previous year.6 Reports of this 
increase sparked a media frenzy in the city, with news outlets and political elites claiming 
without evidence that the repeal of stop-and-frisk had led to New York City’s latest 
“crime wave.”7 In this article, I examine statistical data culled from the New York Police 
Department’s extensive reports on both the city’s crime rates and the numbers of stops 
conducted by law enforcement officers to assess whether or not there is any relationship 
between implementation of stop-and-frisk and the homicide rate. That is, did the 
curtailing of the number of stops made by the NYPD since Mayor de Blasio took office 
cause the increase in homicides in the first two quarters of 2015? More generally, is there 
any evidence to support the suggestion that a reduction in the number of stops led to an 
increase in homicides and other violent crimes in New York City? 
 Historical crime data suggests that there is no discernable relationship between 
the number of stops conducted per year and the annual homicide rate in New York City. 
Additionally, national crime statistics confirm that the homicide rates in many cities 
across the United States increased in the early months of 2015, with “at least 30 of the 
                                                 
5 The City of New York. The Office of the Mayor. “Transcript: Mayor de Blasio and 
Commissioner Bratton Announce Safest August-November Period Since Modern Crime 
Statistics Began in 1993.” 2 December 2014. Web. 
6 Parascandola, Rocco, Tina Moore, Bill Hutchinson. “Murders up 205 in 2015 in Year-
to-Year Comparison, NYPD Says.” New York Daily News 3 March 2015. Web. 
7 Post Editorial Board. “How Many New Yorkers Must Die Before the Mayor Brings 
back Stop-and-Frisk?” New York Post. 1 June 2015. Web. 
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nation’s cities report[ing] increases in murders, violent crimes, or both.”8 This suggests 
that the surge in violent crime is not unique to New York or a function of the change in 
NYPD policy, but is a part of a national trend. Some may argue that New York might 
have been exempt from this countrywide phenomenon if stop-and-frisk had not been 
repealed. However, a cross-sectional analysis of crime and policing statistics in Newark, 
NJ and Chicago, IL reveal that the homicide rates in both cities increased in the early 
months of 2015, despite the continued use of the stop-and-frisk policy by their respective 
police departments. 
 In the next section, I detail the history of crime in New York City and its 
relationship to the origins of stop-and-frisk, paying particular attention to the rise of 
“broken windows” policing and the vast expansion of stop-and-frisk between the years of 
2002 to 2011. I then examine the different theories posited by criminologists, law 
enforcement officials, and political actors regarding the causes of the increase in violent 
crime in both New York City and across the nation in early 2015. Following this, I 
present historical crime and law enforcement data in New York City and a cross-city 
analysis of violent crime rates throughout the United States in 2015. 
History of Crime in New York City and The Origins of Stop-and-Frisk: 
 In order to understand the intense contemporary focus on the efficacy of stop-and-
frisk, the origins and trajectory of the policy need to be examined in the context of violent 
crime in New York City. From 1965 to 1990, the homicide rate in NYC saw a cumulative 
                                                 
8 Davey, Monica, Mitch Smith. “Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities.” New 
York Times 31 August 2015. Web. 
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increase of 254%.9 This era is often referred to as “the bad old days,” when the city was 
notorious for its high levels of violence and drug use, particularly in the late 1980s due to 
the influx of crack cocaine.10 The homicide rate reached its zenith in 1990 when the 
NYPD reported 2,245 murders, constituting an average of 6 a day.11 From 1990 to 2014, 
however, the trend reversed, with the homicide rate decreasing each year (save for 2002, 
which saw an increase of 1.7%). The number of reported murders dwindled to just 333 in 
2014—a decrease of 85.17% as compared to 1990.12 Critically, the reduction in violent 
crime throughout the 1990s is largely attributed to the implementation of “broken 
windows” policing, a policy whose purported success ultimately led to the vast expansion 
of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy. 
 First described by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in a 
1982 article for The Atlantic, the “broken windows” theory is the notion that cracking 
down on minor offenses or “quality-of-life” crimes will lead to a reduction in more 
serious crimes.13 So for example, closely monitoring minor incidents of vandalism will 
discourage both future minor incidents as well as felonious criminal activity. They 
explain: 
…at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a 
kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to 
agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of 
                                                 
9 The City of New York. Office of the Mayor. “Mayor Bloomberg and Police 
Commisionner Kelly Announce 2012 Sets All-Time Record for Fewest Murders and 
Fewest Shootings in New York City History.” 28 December 2012. Web. 
10 Egan, Timothy. “Crack’s Legacy: A Special Report; A Drug Ran its Course, Then Hid 
With Its Users.” New York Times. 19 September 1999. Web. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Historical New York City 
Crime Data. New York: 2015. Web. 
13 Kelling, George L., James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety.” The Atlantic. The Atlantic, March 1983. Web. 
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the windows will soon be broken…Window-breaking does not necessarily occur 
on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers 
whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken 
window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs 
nothing.14 
 
“Broken windows” policing first manifested underground, as a policy used by the New 
York City Transit Police Department. In the late 1980s, an NYCTP officer named Jack 
Maple created the “Charts of the Future” system.15 Maple created a map, which took up 
“55 feet of wall space,” of the entire NYC subway system.16 He then “used crayons to 
mark every violent crime, robbery and larceny that occurred,” and marked them as 
“solved or unsolved.”17 The map revealed “patterns and chronic conditions” of criminal 
activity in certain areas which allowed Maple to anticipate future crimes and efficiently 
deploy officers to those areas. In an interview, Maple explained, “The beauty of the 
mapping is that it poses the question, ‘Why? What are the underlying causes of why there 
is a certain cluster of crime in a particular place?’”18 
 In 1990, William J. Bratton became the chief of the New York City Transit Police, 
at which point he saw Maple’s map as an opportunity to apply the “broken windows” 
approach to transit policing.19 Under Bratton, the NYCTP used Maple’s map to chart and 
crack down on minor offenses such as fare-dodging and graffiti. Between 1990 and 1993, 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Martin, Douglas. “Jack Maple, 48, Designer of City Crime Control Strategies.” New 
York Times 6 August 2001. Web. 
16 Dussault, Raymond. “Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence.” Government Technology 
Magazine 31 March 1999. Web. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bratton, William J. “Interview: Victory in the Subways.” City Journal. Summer, 1992. 
Web. 
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“underground” crime rates fell by 35.9%.20 The crime rate of the “city above” also 
decreased by 17.9%, where, Bratton maintains, quality-of-life enforcement was “less 
rigorous.”21 Because of the NYCTP’s success, then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed 
Bratton to be the Commissioner of the NYPD in 1994.22 
 As NYPD Commissioner, Bratton appointed Maple as Deputy Police 
Commissioner and implemented his “Charts of the Future” system on a city-wide scale, 
renaming it “CompStat” (short for Comparative Statistics). CompStat records “weekly, 
monthly, and year-to-date statistics for criminal complaints…arrests for major felony 
categories, and gun violations” with a focus on geographical patterns.23 This information 
is then compiled in an online database. Bratton describes CompStat as a “crime 
accountability system,” which uses crime-mapping and “organizational accountability 
practices,” and which has “recreated, at the executive level, the Broken Windows 
philosophy.”24 Giuliani and Bratton adopted a strict, “zero tolerance” policy against 
minor offenses or “quality-of-life” crimes, such as public urination, graffiti, public 
drunkenness, and vandalism, which they called the “Quality of Life Initiative.”25 
Supporters of “broken windows” note that, from 1993 to 1996, the crime rate for all 
index crimes—homicide, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and 
                                                 
20 The City of New York. The New York City Police Department. Bratton, William J. 
“Broken Windows and Quality-of-Life Policing in New York City.” 2015. Web. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nagy, Andrea R, Joel Podolny. “William Bratton and the NYPD: Crime Control 
Through Middle Management Reform.” Yale School of Management 07. 15. 12 (2008). 
1-28. Web. 
23 Silverman, Eli B. “Crime in New York: A Success Story.” Public Perspective. 1998. 
Web. 
24 Bratton, W. op. cit. 3. 
25 Samaha, Joel. Criminal Law. Belmont: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2001. Print. 
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grand larceny of motor vehicles26—fell by 38.7%, while the homicide rate alone fell by 
48.9%.27 
 During this period from the early to mid 1990s, the NYPD was using stop-and-
frisk, but the policy was restricted to an elite force called the Street Crime Unit— a small, 
plain-clothes unit with the primary stated goal of the recovery of firearms.28 The NYPD 
first adopted stop-and-frisk in 1971, when the New York State Legislature added a 
provision to the Criminal Procedure Law which authorized police officers to stop, 
question, and frisk individuals on the street if he or she has reasonable suspicion, and 
required the officers to submit paperwork outlining the basis for the stop.29 The policy 
was rooted in a 1968 Supreme Court case, Terry v. Ohio, which ruled that a police officer 
is not in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures if he or she has reasonable suspicion for the stop.30 Concurrent with the adoption 
of stop-and-frisk in 1971, the NYPD created the SCU—originally comprised of 60 to 100 
members—as the sole unit with the authority to employ the policy. From the the time of 
                                                 
26 State of New York. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. Criminal 
Justice Statistics. 2015. Web. 
27 Silverman, Eli B. “Crime in New York: A Success Story.” The Public Perspective. 
June/July (1997). Web. 
28 Report on the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy. The Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York. New York: 2013. Web. 
29 New York State. Criminal Procedure Law § 140.50 (1971). This provision required 
NYPD officers to record individual stops on a form called a UF-250, which includes 
information such as the time of the stop, the period of observation prior to the stop, the 
location of the stop, the duration of the stop, the suspected felony or misdemeanor 
justifying the stop, whether or not the individual was questioned or frisked, and whether 
or not the individual was arrested or issued a summons. It also includes personal 
information of the individual stopped including his or her name, their “nickname” or 
“street name,” their date of birth, their address, their sex, their race, and a description of 
their physical appearance. 
30 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. Supreme Court of the United States. 1968. Legal 
Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. Web. 
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the unit’s inception to the height of “broken windows” in the mid 1990s, the SCU 
maintained its small size. 
 In 1997, however, the SCU expanded, proximally because of an “emphasis on 
crime statistics” in the early 1990s, and distally because of the city’s infatuation with the 
“broken windows” approach to policing.31  Howard Safir, who replaced Bratton as NYPD 
Commissioner in 1996, claimed to be “so impressed by the unit’s performance” that he 
increased the size of the SCU by 175%, adding 242 officers to the SCU.32 Due to this 
surge of officers and the NYPD’s fixation on crime statistics, members of the SCU “were 
forced to adhere to an unwritten quota system that demanded that each officer seize at 
least one gun a month.”33 In an interview published by The New York Times, one SCU 
officer claimed, “There are guys who are willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his 
hands in his pockets…And if it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun yet? 
Things can get a little desperate.” This desperation is reflected in the vast increase in the 
number of stops the unit performed, which rose from 18,023 in 1997 to 27,061 in 1998. 
 Using the “broken windows” model, SCU officers began targeting communities of 
color, where there were higher levels of crime. In 1999, The New York Times reported 
that the increase in the number of stops conducted that year “contributed to the 
perception—particularly in minority neighborhoods—that the Police Department’s 
aggressive tactics pose a threat to the safety and civil liberties of the people it is supposed 
to protect.” That same year, the SCU was embroiled in controversy after the fatal 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kocieniewskie, David. “Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets” New 
York Times 15 February 1999. Web. 
33 Ibid. 
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shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from Guinea on February 4th, 1999. 
As Diallo “stood, unarmed in the vestibule of his apartment building,” four SCU officers 
fired a total of 41 bullets at him, claiming they mistook his wallet for a gun.34 Diallo’s 
death “ignited demonstrations across the city,” largely organized by the Coalition Against 
Police Brutality.35 That same year, the Center of Constitutional Rights filed a case against 
the NYPD—Daniels et al. v. The City of New York et al.—which cited racial profiling 
and called for the disbanding of the SCU.36 
Michael Bloomberg was elected Mayor of New York City in 2002. That year, 
Bloomberg disbanded the SCU while the Daniel’s case was still in progress.37 Rather 
than tempering police stops, however, the closure of the SCU led to a huge expansion of 
the stop-and-frisk policy. No longer confined to one department, the policy became a 
“widespread official practice” of the NYPD across all departments.38 In 2003, Bloomberg 
appointed Raymond Kelly as Commissioner of the NYPD and together, Bloomberg and 
Kelly greatly expanded the use of the policy. When Bloomberg took office in 2002, the 
                                                 
34 Fritsch, Jane. “The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are 
Acquitted of All Charges.” New York Times 26 February 2000. Web. 
35 Ibid. NYPD Officers Carroll, McMellon, Boss, and Murphy were acquitted of all 
charges on February 25, 2000 by a Bronx District Court. It should be noted that all four 
officers were white and that the jury which decided the case consisted of four black 
women, one white woman, and seven white men. Though the officers were acquitted, the 
suit challenged the legality of stop-and-frisk, on the basis that it violated the Fourth 
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The case was settled 
on December 12, 2003, and the settlement agreement required the NYPD to both audit 
officers who engaged in stops and to provide the results of the audits to the Center for 
Constitutional Rights on a quarterly basis. 
36 “Daniels, et al. v. the City of New York.” Center for Constitutional Rights. 1999. 
Historic Cases. Web. 
37 Rashbaum, William K., Al Baker. “Police Commissioner Closing Controversial Street 
Crime Unit.” New York Times 10 April 2002. Web. 
38 Report on the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy. The Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York. New York: 2013. Web. 
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NYPD conducted 97,296 stops. In 2011, the year which saw the most stops ever 
conducted by the NYPD, the number had risen to 685,724—an increase of 604.8%. 
During Bloomberg’s three terms as Mayor, several reports found the policy to be racially 
discriminatory and numerous lawsuits were filed against the city, citing racial profiling. 
In 2011, then Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, along with several other 
elected officials in the city government, asked the U.S. Department of Justice to open an 
investigation into the NYPD.39 From 2011-2013, Bloomberg’s last two years in office, 
the number of stops decreased slightly. Mayor Bloomberg said in an interview that the 
decrease in stops was a result of the decrease in crime rates. He explained, “The crime 
goes down, the number of stop-and-frisks…goes down.”40 However, several media 
outlets including The New York Times have posited that the decrease was more likely due 
to the “increasing pressure” on the NYPD to reform the policy.41 
The Cyclical Nature of Crime: 
William Bratton, who first introduced the “broken windows” approach to policing 
to the NYPD in 1994, reassumed his position as Police Commissioner under Mayor de 
Blasio in 2014.42 Under de Blasio, Bratton has defended the repeal of the policy, and 
even points out its inefficacy. In an op-ed piece he wrote for The New York Post, Bratton 
asserted, “It’s time for a sense of proportion about the increase in shootings and murders 
                                                 
39 Mathas, Christopher. “Stott Stringer, Officials Call For Federal Investigation of 
NYPD’s Stop-And-Friisk Program.” The Huffington Post 20 October 2011. Web. 
40 Durkin, Erin and Joe Kemp. “Mayor Bloomberg: Stop-and-frisk is Lowering NYC 
Crime, Need for Searches.” New York Daily News 8 May 2013. Web. 
41 “Injustices of Stop and Frisk.” New York Times. 13 May 2012. Web. 
42 Goodman, David J. “Bratton to Lead New York Police for Second Time.” New York 
Times 5 December 2013. Web. 
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in New York City in the first five months of 2015.”43 He asserts, “To suggest that this 
relatively minor increase has been caused by Mayor Bill de Blasio’s opposition to 
reasonable-suspicion stops is a ludicrous misrepresentation.”44 To defend his position, 
Bratton points to the inconsistent crime statistics the policy has returned in recent years. 
“In 2011,” he writes, “the NYPD reported about 685,000 reasonable-suspicion stops. 
That year, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries and grand larcenies all increased…Last 
year, stops had been cut… by more than 90 percent,” and the city saw “an overall decline 
in index crime of 4.1 percent.”45 He concludes, “Clearly, the supposed relationship 
between decreasing stops and increasing crime is not supported by the numbers.”46 
As an alternative theory, Bratton points out that crime rates are somewhat 
cyclical, and follow a general trend of ebbs and flows. “…These numbers tend to move in 
ranges, with small upticks in some years and some categories,” he explains, “even during 
periods when overall crime is declining.”47 This theory is supported by criminologist Ana 
Joanes. In an article published by the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems in 
2000, Joanes demonstrates that the decline in NYC’s homicide rate in the 1990s was part 
of a larger decline of homicide rates nationwide and explains that this universal decline is 
a function of the fact that, historically, the national homicide rate in the U.S. follows a 
recurrent trend of increases and decreases. Joanes explains, “Since the 1930s, the trend in 
U.S. homicide rates shows both an unprecedented rise in the number of homicides and a 
                                                 
43 Bratton, Bill. “Crime Surge Not a Return to NYC’s ‘Bad Old Days.’” The New York 
Post. The New York Post, 9 June 2015. Web. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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cyclical pattern covering three distinct periods of increase and decline.”48 The mid-1930s 
saw a peak in homicide rates, followed by a thirty-year period of decline, during which 
the national homicide rate fell to “4.6 homicides per 100,000 persons in 1963.”49 
Homicides increased again for the next seventeen years, “peaking in 1980 at a rate of 
10.2, which was more than twice the rate in 1963.”50 The rate decreased again over the 
next five years, “only to begin another increase in 1985” which continued until 1991.51 
Joanes notes that, since its peak in 1991, the national homicide rate again began to 
fall, continuing the cycle, and the decline in NYC’s homicide rate in the 1990s is a 
function of this pattern. Using a cross-city comparison of homicide cycles in seventeen 
cities nationwide over the twenty-two-year period from 1976 to 1998, Joanes found, 
“from a cyclical perspective, the decline in New York City’s homicide rate from its 1991 
peak, although dramatic, is well within the range of decreases observed in half of the 
seventeen largest U.S. cities, and below the declines of five other cities.”52 
Just as this decline in the 1990s followed a national trend, national crime statistics 
suggest that the increase in NYC’s homicide rate in early 2015 suggest that the uptick is, 
again, a function of this cyclical pattern. For example, The New York Times reported that, 
from January to August of 2015, as compared to the same period in 2014, “at least 35 of 
                                                 
48 Joanes, Ana. “Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the 
Decline in New York City’s Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing 
Strategies and Homicide Rates.” Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 33 
(1999-2000): 265-312. Web. 281. 
49 Ibid, 284. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 298. 
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the nation’s cities report[ed] increases in murders, violent crimes, or both.”53 While the 
cyclical nature of the homicide rate might partly explain this upturn, the immediate 
effects of increases in violent crimes and the extent of cross-city increases in 2015 in 
some major cities—up by as much as 76% in Milwaukee— is large enough to have 
incited anxiety across the U.S. as exhibited by the plethora of news stories on the subject, 
and the response of criminologists, political actors and law enforcement officials.54 
The “Ferguson Effect”: 
The report on the nationwide increase in homicide rates in 2015, published by The 
New York Times in August of that year, noted that the three U.S. cities which saw the 
most dramatic increases were Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Baltimore. The article points out 
that, in these particular cities, “tensions over race and police conduct have risen” recently 
due to local incidents of police brutality. The article goes on to explain that, because the 
largest increases in homicide rates occurred in cities where protests against police 
misconduct have been the most fervent, “Some officials say intense national scrutiny of 
the use of force by police has made officers less aggressive and emboldened criminals.” 
This “popular theory” among “some experts and rank-and-file officers,” the Times 
clarified, is known as the “Ferguson effect.”55 
The “Ferguson effect” refers to the city of Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St. 
Louis, which has become a symbol for the deterioration of police-community relations 
and the recent focus on the racially disparate violence on the part of law enforcement 
                                                 
53 Davey, Monica and Mitch Smith. “Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities.” 
New York Times 31 August 2015. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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officers towards black men and women. The contemporary concentration on police 
brutality was prompted by the murder of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager 
who was fatally shot by George Zimmerman in Sanford, Florida on February 26, 2012.56 
Zimmerman, who was not a police officer but a captain of the local neighborhood watch, 
called 911 to report a “suspicious person” after he observed Martin “just walking around 
looking about,” wearing a hoodie.57 Zimmerman was charged with both second-degree 
murder and manslaughter.58 On July 13, 2013, Zimmerman was acquitted of all charges. 
Martin’s death prompted nationwide protests, including the “Million Hoodie March” in 
Manhattan.59 
A little more than a year after Zimmerman’s acquittal, the city of Ferguson 
erupted in protests following the death of Michael Brown—an unarmed black teenager 
who was shot by a white police officer named Darren Wilson on August 9, 2014.60 
Wilson, who believed that Mr. Brown “fit the description of a suspect in a convenience 
store theft,” shot him through the window of his police vehicle. Mr. Brown’s death 
“prompted weeks of demonstrations” throughout the city. Wilson was brought before a 
St. Louis County grand jury, and on November 24th, 2014, the jury ruled not to indict 
him.61 The non-indictment decision prompted another series of protests throughout 
                                                 
56 Alvarez, Lizette, Cara Buckley. “Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon 
Martin.” New York Times 14 July 2013. Web. 
57 Toobin, Jeffrey. “The Facts in the Zimmerman Trial.” The New Yorker 16 July 2013. 
Web. 
58 Johnson, Kevin, Yamiche Alcindor. “No Federal Charges for Zimmerman in Trayvon 
Martin Death.” USA Today 24 February 2015. Web. 
59 Hajela, Deepti. “Trayvon Martin ‘Million Hoodie March’ March Draws Hundreds in 
New York City.” The Huffington Post 21 May 2012. Web. 
60 “What Happened in Ferguson?” The New York Times. 10 August 2015. Web. 
61 Ibid. 
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Ferguson, which lasted for several weeks and which prompted Governor Jay Nixon to 
deploy the Missouri National Guard.62 
A week after the grand jury decision in Ferguson was announced, a grand jury in 
Staten Island also decided not to indict an NYPD officer for the murder of Eric Garner.63 
Garner, an unarmed black man, was killed by NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo, during an 
encounter in which a group of NYPD officers approached Garner for selling “loose 
cigarettes.”64 The incident was filmed by Staten Island resident Ramsey Orta. In the 
video, Pantaleo is seen putting Garner in a chokehold while other NYPD officers 
wrestled Garner to the floor. Garner can be heard saying “I can’t breathe,” at total of 
eleven times until he was fatally suffocated.65 The recording went viral, sparking protests 
throughout New York City and across the country. The decision not to indict officer 
Pantaleo was followed by emboldened protests in Ferguson, as well as other cities across 
the nation. 
The decision not to indict Zimmerman for the death of Trayvon Martin marked 
the beginning of a national focus on police brutality, specifically the widespread and 
disproportionate violence of police officers towards young brown and black men. The 
grand jury decisions in both Ferguson and Staten Island highlighted the systemic nature 
of police brutality, as well as the complicity of both city and state governments, who 
failed to hold the officers accountable for their actions, even in cases wherein the 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Goodman, David J., Al Baker. “Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict 
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case.” New York Times 3 December 2014. Web. 
64 Baker, Al, J. David Goodman, and Benjamin Mueller. “Beyond the Chokehold: The 
Path to Eric Garner’s Death.” New York Times 13 June 2015. Web. 
65 Baker, Al, J. David Goodman, and Benjamin Mueller. “Beyond the Chokehold: The 
Path to Eric Garner’s Death.” New York Times 13 June 2015. Web. 
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evidence is incontrovertible, such as the Eric Garner decision. The protests in Ferguson 
were a response to the general issue of police misconduct. As The Huffington Post wrote 
of the protests in Ferguson, “The marchers…are not just protesting Brown’s slaying. 
They are also voicing pent-up anger at an old problem.”66 
The “Ferguson effect” theory is the notion that the increase in the homicide rate in 
2015 can be explained by the fact that the recent focus on police misconduct and 
widespread criticism of certain police officers who have perpetrated violence against 
people of color has made law enforcement officials reluctant to do their jobs. The theory 
was first termed by St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson in November of 2014. Dotson, in 
an interview at the police headquarters in St. Louis, said, “I’ve experienced an uptick in 
crime. While I’m sure some professor, later on, will study it, it certainly does appear that 
individuals are using the cause or the conversation that’s going on, to justify some of 
their actions.”67 In other words, the “conversation that’s going on,”—the nationwide 
condemnation of discriminatory policing policies—has created a rift in police-community 
relations, wherein law enforcement officials are reluctant to do their jobs. The theory 
suggests that officers either fear the possibility of being the next subject of national 
scrutiny or they resent the fact that the officers in these incidents were widely condemned 
for acting as they were trained to—for “just doing their job”—and have reacted by 
shirking community engagement. 
                                                 
66 Bach, Natasha. “Police Violence Has Been Going On Forever. No Wonder People Are 
Fed Up With It.” The Huffington Post. 23 August 2014. Web. 
67 Byers, Christine. “Crime Up After Ferguson and More Police Needed, Top St. Louis 
Area Chiefs Say.” St. Louis Today 15 November 2014. Web. 
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 The “Ferguson effect” garnered a more legitimate place in the national debate 
when the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, James B. Comey, claimed the 
validity of the theory in a speech he gave on October 23rd, 2015. He asserts, 
“…something has changed in 2015. Far more people are being killed in America’s cities 
this year than in many years. And let’s be clear: far more people of color are being killed 
in America’s cities this year. And it’s not the cops doing the killing.”68 He then lists a 
number of theories that he’s heard in “a lot of thoughtful conversations with law 
enforcement, elected officials, academics, and community members,” regarding this 
change, such as “the return of violent offenders”, “cheap heroin or synthetic drugs,” 
“smaller groups fighting for turf,” “a change in the justice system’s approach to bail or 
charging or sentencing,” or a change “with respect to the availability of guns.” Comey 
dismisses these theories saying, “None of them explain both the map and the calendar in 
disparate cities over the last 10 months.” He then comes to his own conclusion—the 
“Ferguson effect.” “Nobody says it on the record,” Comey claims, “nobody says it in 
public, but police and elected officials are quietly saying it to themselves. And they’re 
saying it to me, and I’m going to say it to you.”69 He explains: 
In today’s YouTube world, are officers reluctant to get out of their cars and do the 
work that controls violent crime? Are officers answering 911 calls but avoiding 
the informal contact that keeps bad guys from standing around, especially with 
guns? I spoke to officers privately in one big city precinct who described being 
surrounded by young people with mobile phone cameras held high, taunting them 
the moment they get out of their cars. They told me, ‘We feel like we’re under 
siege and we don’t feel much like getting out of our cars.’ …The question that has 
been asked of me, is whether these kinds of things are changing police behavior 
all over the country…I don’t know whether this explains it entirely, but I do have 
                                                 
68 The United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Comey, James B. “Law 
Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending the Lines Toward Safety and 
Justice.” 23 October 2015. Web 
69 Ibid. 
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a strong sense that some part of the explanation is a chill wind blowing through 
American law enforcement over the last year. And that wind is surely changing 
behavior.70 
 
When Comey refers to the “chill wind blowing through American law enforcement,” he 
is referring to the national acknowledgement and disparagement of racist and violent 
behavior on the part of police officers towards people of color. 
 Director Comey’s official recognition of the “Ferguson effect” theory, which, as 
he mentions, was at first only “quietly” discussed amongst elected officials and police 
officers, prompted a response from President Barack Obama. During a speech he gave at 
the International Chiefs of Police annual conference in Chicago on October 27, 2015, 
Obama refuted the theory. While he doesn’t refer to the “Ferguson effect” by its name, he 
denies its underlying premise by asserting, “I reject any narrative that seeks to divide 
police and communities that they serve.”71 He goes on: 
It is true that in some cities, including here in my hometown of Chicago, gun 
violence and homicides have spiked—and in some cases they’ve spiked 
significantly… And let’s face it, the media tends to focus on the sensational and 
the controversial, and folks on both sides who say stuff that’s not designed to 
bring people together but oftentimes makes the situation more polarized…What 
we can’t do is cherry-pick data or use anecdotal evidence to drive policy or to 
feed political agendas…With today’s technology, if just one of your officers does 
something irresponsible, the whole world knows about it moments later. And the 
countless incidents of effective police work rarely make it on the evening 
news…But you know as well as I do that the tensions in some communities, the 
feeling that law enforcement isn’t always applied fairly, those sentiments don’t 
just come out of nowhere.72 
 
While Obama acknowledges that the anger surrounding incidents of police brutality has 
translated into a universal distrust of law enforcement officials in general, he maintains 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Sweet, Lynn. “Obama’s Chicago Criminal Justice Speech. Transcript.” Chicago Sun-
Times. 27 October 2015. Web. 
72 Ibid. 
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that this anger is warranted. He then invalidates the “Ferguson effect” theory by pointing 
out that the concept is not supported by hard evidence. Its supporters are “cherry-picking 
data” by relying on piece-meal information and “anecdotal evidence” to support their 
claim. Rather than pointing to statistics, Comey is basing his support of the theory on 
private conversations he’s had with officers who are most likely biased. 
The comments of both Comey and Obama has created a division in the Obama 
administration between government officials who either support or deny the validity of 
the “Ferguson effect” theory. Charles Rosenberg, the Acting Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, supported Comey by saying, “I think he’s spot on…I think 
there’s something to it.”73 He explains, “I rely on the chiefs and the sheriffs who are 
saying that they have seen or heard behavioral changes among the men and women of 
their forces…The manifestation of it may be a reluctance to engage.”74 He goes on, 
“Rightly or wrongly, you become the next viral video…Now you can do everything right 
and still end up on the evening news.”75 As a response, White House press secretary Josh 
Earnest directly refuted both Comey’s and Rosenberg’s assertion. During a press 
conference held the White House, Earnest said, “Mr. Rosenberg is the second 
administration official to make that kind of claim without any evidence…The fact is, the 
evidence does not support the claim that somehow our law enforcement officers all 
across the country are shirking their duties.”76 Indeed, the problem with the “Ferguson 
                                                 
73 Frankel, Todd C. “DEA Chief Joins FBI Chief in Giving Credence to ‘Ferguson 
Effect.’” Washington Post 4 November 2015. Web. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Fabian, Jordan. “White House Rebuffs DEA Chief on ‘Ferguson Effect.’” The Hill 6 
November 2015. Web. 
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Effect” theory is that it is just that—a theory. There has been very little discussion of data 
or statistics to support this claim. 
Drugs and Gangs: 
Mayor Bill de Blasio has attributed the rise in violent crime rates in NYC in early 
2015 to both “drug-related violence” and “gang-related activity,” which are frequently 
interconnected. In a press release issued on July 29, 2015 by the Office of the Mayor, de 
Blasio asserted, “Despite dramatic reductions in violent crime, New York City 
experiences isolated shooting spikes, often connected to drug gangs.”77 He maintains that 
these spikes in violent crime are not city-wide, but occur in specific neighborhoods. He 
explains, “Although shootings vary year to year and borough to borough, these incidents 
tend to be concentrated in a few neighborhoods and largely committed by a few gangs 
and street crews.”78 The press release points to the fact that, “Four of the top 10 precincts 
for narcotics arrests are also in the top 10 precincts for shooting incidents. These four 
precincts account for 12.8 percent of narcotics arrests and 18.4 percent of shooting 
incidents citywide.”79 In other words, the assumption that the repeal of stop-and-frisk 
contributed to a general increase in violent behavior does not take into account the fact 
that the overall NYPD statistics on violent crime are heavily influenced by just a few 
precincts. 
The assertion that 2015 saw an increase in gang activity is supported by the fact 
that the city has seen an enormous increase in the distribution of heroin in recent years. 
                                                 
77 The City of New York. Office of the Mayor. “Mayor de Blasio Announces Over $2 
Million Annual Investment to Fund Anti-Violence Prosecution Strategies That Target 
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As The New York Post reported, in 2015, “Federal authorities seized a record-breaking 
amount of heroin in New York City…that accounted for roughly one-third of all the 
drugs recovered nationwide.”80 That year, the DEA confiscated 880 kilograms total, 
which “was far above the 517 kilograms…netted in 2014, and more than ten times 2009’s 
total of 86 kilograms.”81 In fact, in 2015, “In January alone, 148 kilos were seized—or 
about double for all of 2009.”82 This influx of heroin is reflected in the recent surge in 
heroin overdoses throughout the city. In July of 2015, the Special Narcotics Prosecutor 
under de Blasio, Bridget Brennan, reported that, in New York City, “…heroin overdoses 
have outpaced homicides for two years in a row.”83 
In response to this growing epidemic, the de Blasio administration allocated “a 
more than $2 million annual investment” to expand the Office of the Special Narcotics 
Prosecutor in July of 2015.84 The funds will go towards the “investigation and 
prosecution of crimes involving gun violence and narcotics trafficking, as well as the 
Office’s strategies to address the heroin epidemic.”85 With this investment, Mayor de 
Blasio is focusing on treating the underlying societal problems which perpetuate the 
degraded status of communities of color in New York and which are the cause of higher 
crime rates in certain areas. 
Data, Methods, and Results: 
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In this section, I gather the relevant data covering stop-and-frisk practices from its 
expansion in 2002 to the first two quarters of 2015 (the most recent period for which data 
on stop-and-frisk in NYC is available), as well as data on the annual homicide rate in 
New York City over this time period. In Table 1, I compare the percent change in the 
frequency of stops from year-to-year to the the percent change in the annual homicide 
rate to determine whether or not whether or not there is a discernable relationship 
between the two variables. More specifically, I examine whether or not there is a direct, 
inverse correlation between a change in the number of stops and a change in the homicide 
rate. That is, whether or not the purported reason for the stop-and-frisk policy—a 
reduction in violent crime—has produced the expected result. 
I then compile the data pertaining to the number of guns seized by the NYPD 
each year over the same period. In Table 2, I compare this information with the annual 
rate of stops in order to discern how effective the policy is in terms of firearm recovery. 
Following this, I present a statistical analysis of the racial breakdown of stops each year 
in Table 3 to ascertain whether or not and the extent to which the policy is racially 
discriminatory. 
Historical crime data is published by the NYPD on a weekly, quarterly, and 
yearly basis on the department’s website and can be found in the “Crime Statistics” 
section of the site. The information reflects both city-wide crime statistics and specific 
data for each individual precinct, and is broken down into all seven index crime 
categories. Data on the frequency of stop-and-frisk is drawn from the NYPD’s online 
information database—the CompStat system—introduced by Commissioner Bratton in 
2002. The NYPD publishes stop-and-frisk data annually on the department’s website, 
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which can be accessed by the public on the “Stop, Question, and Frisk Report Database” 
in the “Reports and Information” section of the site. The publication of this information, 
as I noted earlier, is a result of the settlement reached in the Diallo case, so information 
released by the NYPD only dates back to 2003. It is compiled in the form of 
downloadable Excel spreadsheets, which include information on each individual stop 
made and the specific information pertaining to each stop collected on UF-250 forms. 
While the NYPD itself releases stop-and-frisk data to the public on a yearly basis, 
as part of the Diallo settlement, it is required to release stop-and-frisk information on a 
quarterly basis to the Center for Constitutional Rights. The CCR then passes these 
quarterly reports to the American Civil Liberties Union of New York, which posts the 
information on the “NYPD Quarterly Reports” page of their website. In addition to 
releasing the NYPD data on a quarterly basis, the ACLU releases annual reports on stop-
and-frisk which include data on both the number of arrests made as a result of the policy 
and a racial breakdown of the stops performed. The ACLU also intermittently publishes 
in depth analyses of stop-and-frisk statistics. The data on the rate of firearm seizure is 
culled from an ACLU report published in 2014. 
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Table 1: 
Homicide Rate vs. Number of Stops, NYC: 2002-2015 
 
*The 2nd quarter of 2015 ended on June 30th, 2015. I stopped including data after the 2nd 
quarter of 2015 because, while the homicide rate for the third quarter of 2015 is available, 
the stop-and-frisk data has not yet been released. 
 
The data shows that the number of stops performed annually by the NYPD 
increased each year from 2002 to 2011, save for 2007, when the number of stops 
decreased by 6.8%. In 2002, the year that Mayor Bloomberg began the expansion of stop-
and-frisk, the NYPD conducted 97,296 stops. In 2011, when the number of stops made 
by the NYPD was at its highest, the number of stops had increased to 685,724, an 
Year Number 
of 
Homicides 
Number 
of Stops 
Percent 
Change in 
Homicide 
Rate from 
Previous 
Year 
Percent 
Change 
in Stops 
from 
Previous 
Year 
Correlation 
between % 
Change in 
Stops and % 
Change in 
Homicide 
Rate 
Did Stop 
and Frisk 
Produce 
Expected 
Result? 
2002 587 97,296 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2003 597 160,851 +1.7% +65.3% Positive No 
2004 570 313,523 -4.5% +94.9% Negative Yes 
2005 539 398,191 -5.4% +27% Negative Yes 
2006 596 506,491 +10.6% +27.2% Positive No 
2007 496 472,096 -16.8% -6.8% Positive No 
2008 523 540,302 +5.4% +14.4% Positive No 
2009 471 581,168 -9.9% +7.6% Negative Yes 
2010 536 601,285 +13.8% +3.5% Positive No 
2011 515 685,724 -3.9% +14% Negative Yes 
2012 419 532,911 -18.6% -22.3% Positive No 
2013 335 191,558 -20% -64.1% Positive No 
2014 333 46,235 -.6% -75.9% Positive No 
2015, 
First 2 
Quarters* 
161 13,604 145 
homicides 
during first 
two quarters 
of 
2014=+11% 
27,527 
stops 
during 
first two 
quarters 
of 2014=         
-50.6% 
Negative Yes 
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increase of 604.8% as compared to 2002.86 During that time period, the homicide rate did 
drop by 12.3%.87 While this decrease does coincide with expansion of the policy, when 
compared to the huge increase in the number of stops performed, the relatively small 
decrease in the number of homicides does not represent an appreciable change. 
Additionally, broken down into annual increments, the crime statistics from 2002 
to the first two quarters of 2015 suggest that year-to-year, the percent change in the 
number of stops performed by the NYPD does not directly and inversely affect the crime 
rate, as proponents of stop-and-frisk would have us believe. For example, from 2002-
2003 the number of stops increased by 65.3% while the homicide rate increased by 1.7%. 
Proponents of stop-and-frisk might suggest that, in 2002, the policy had only just begun 
to be widely practiced by NYPD officers and the increase in the homicide rate that year is 
a function of the city needing time to adjust to its implementation. And, indeed, over the 
following two-year period from 2003-2005, the rate of stops increased by 147.5% while 
the homicide rate fell by 9.7%. However, from 2005-2006, the number of stops again 
increased by 27.2% while the homicide rate actually increased by 10.6%, suggesting that, 
even after an adjustment period, an increase in stops does not necessarily result in a 
decrease in homicides. Even worse for stop-and-frisk proponents, from 2006-2007 the 
number of stops actually decreased by 6.8% while the homicide rate fell by 16.8%. This 
concordant trend continued the following year when, from 2007-2008, the number of 
stops increased by 14.4% while the homicide rate increased by 5.4%. The number of 
                                                 
86 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Stop, Question, and frisk 
Report Database. New York: 2015. Web. 
87 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Historical New York City 
Crime Data. New York: 2015. Web. 
 27 
stops made by the NYPD has decreased each year since 2011, as have homicide rates up 
until this recent increase. 
 In sum, out of the thirteen years of examined data, only five of the thirteen years 
demonstrate a direct, inverse correlation between the number of stops performed and the 
homicide rate. Put differently, data from eight of the thirteen years suggest that homicide 
rates would actually decrease if the practice of stop-and-frisk is reduced. The 
inconsistency of the data demonstrates that there is no consistent, discernable relationship 
between the number of stops performed annually and the number of homicides reported 
by the NYPD. 
 In addition to the lack of any correlation between these two variables, the data 
shows little correlation between the number of stops conducted by NYPD each year and 
the annual crime rate in all seven index crime categories. As the New York City Bar 
Association (NYCBA) reported, “the increase of 100,000 stops between 2008 and 2011 
did not correspond to an appreciable change in the violent crime rate, which then dropped 
again in 2012 even as the number of stops fell by 150,000.”88 Additionally, “the years 
2008-11 show that, despite a 27% increase in stops and frisks, shootings had not gone 
down, and indeed in 2011, a year with nearly 686,000 stops, the number of shootings 
actually rose.”89 As in the category of homicide, the data shows that stop-and-frisk has no 
relationship to the rate of robbery, with only five out of the thirteen years showing a 
direct, inverse correlation.90 Grand Larceny showed only six out of the thirteen years 
                                                 
88 Report on the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy. The Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York. New York: 2013. 11. Web. 
89 Ibid. 
90 The City of New York. New York City Police Department. Historical New York City 
Crime Data: Citywide Seven Major Felony Offenses 2000-2014. New York: 2015. Web. 
 28 
returning the expected result, while the categories of burglary, felony assault, and rape  
showed 8 out of the thirteen years returning the expected result.91 Grand larceny of motor  
vehicles seems to be the crime category that’s most directly impacted by a change in the 
rate of stops, with nine out of the thirteen years showing a direct, inverse correlation.92 
Table 2: 
Rate of Firearm Seizure vs. Number of Stops, NYC: 2002-2015 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Destefano, Anthony M. “Gun Seizures Down After Drop in NYPD Stop-And-Frisk 
Activity, Rise in Homicides, Data Shows.” Newsday. Newsday, 1 September 2015. Web. 
94 Ibid. 
Year Number 
of 
Firearm 
Seizures 
Number 
of Stops 
% 
Firearm 
Recovery 
vs. 
Number 
of Stops 
% 
Change 
in Rate 
of 
Seizure 
from 
Previous 
Year 
Percent 
Change 
in Stops 
from 
Previous 
Year 
Correlation Did 
“Stop 
and 
Frisk” 
Produce 
Expected 
Result? 
2002 N/A* 97,296 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2003 633 160,851 .39% N/A +65.3% N/A N/A 
2004 745 313,523 .24% +17.70% +94.9% Positive Yes 
2005 676 398,191 .17% -9.26% +27% Negative No 
2006 700 506,491 .14% +3.55% +27.2% Positive Yes 
2007 687 472,096 .15% -1.86% -6.8% Positive Yes 
2008 840 540,302 .16% +22.27% +14.4% Positive Yes 
2009 762 581,168 .13% -9.29% +7.6% Negative No 
2010 790 601,285 .13% +3.67% +3.5% Positive Yes 
2011 819 685,724 .12% +3.67% +14% Positive Yes 
2012 729 532,911 .14% -10.99% -22.3% Positive Yes 
2013 397 191,558 .21% -45.54% -64.1% Positive Yes 
2014 20193 46,235 .43% -49.37% -75.9% Positive Yes 
2015, 
First 2 
Quarters 
7994 13,604 .58% -60.70% 27,527 
stops 
during 
first two 
quarters 
of 
Positive Yes 
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*Data for 2002 excluded because 2003 was the first year for which gun-seizure 
information was collected. 
 
Stop-and-frisk was initially proposed as a means to collect firearms, based on the 
expectation that the seizure of guns would lead to an eventual reduction in homicide 
rates.95 The data show that, for the twelve years of available data, the annual rate of 
firearm recovery is responsive to changes in the number of stops made, with ten out of 
the twelve years showing a direct, inverse correlation. However, the overall number of 
firearms collected is extremely low. From 2003 to the first two quarters of 2015, the 
NYPD conducted a total of 5,141,235 stops and seized just 8,058 guns, which is a 
recovery rate of .15%. In other words, the NYPD seized one gun for every 638 people 
they stopped—a rate which suggests that the policy is ineffective in this regard. In 
addition to a low firearm recovery rate, stop-and-frisk data shows a low arrest rate in 
general. From 2002 to the first two quarters of 2015, the number of stops conducted that 
did not result in an arrest or the issuing of a summons made up 86.7% of all stops. The 
low arrest rate has remained relatively consistent each year, despite major fluctuations in 
the annual rate of stops. Over the fourteen-year period between 2002 and the first two 
quarters of 2015, the number of arrests made as a result of stop-and-frisk has deviated by 
only 9%.96 This suggests that the annual arrest rate is not affected by changes in the rate 
of stops. 
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96 Ibid. 
2014=         
-50.6% 
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While the data presented thus far suggests that stop-and-frisk’s relationship to 
crime is nonexistent, further evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that there is a 
planned component to the execution of stop-and-frisk. In Table 3 I examine the 
demographic breakdown of stops performed annually in terms of race. The annual NYPD 
stop-and-frisk reports include a racial breakdown of the statistics, for which the 
categories are divided into “American Indian,” “Asian/Pacific Islander,” “Black 
Hispanic,” “White,” “White Hispanic,” and “Not Listed.” In my analysis, I focus on the 
categories of “Black,” “Latino,” and “White,” in that these three demographics comprise 
the vast majority of stops and are the racial categories for which stop-and-frisk data is 
published by both the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights, and which are the 
subject of litigation which cites racial discrimination against the city. 
Table 3: 
Racial Breakdown of Stops, NYC: 2003-2015 
 
Year Number of Stops Black Latino White 
2002 97,296 N/A* N/A N/A 
2003 160,851 77,704=54% 44,581=31% 17,623=12% 
2004 313,523 155,033=55% 89,937=32% 28,913=10% 
2005 398,191 196,570=54% 115,088=32% 40,713=11% 
2006 506,491 267,468=53% 147,862=29% 53,500=11% 
2007 472,096 243,766=54% 141,868=31% 52,887=12% 
2008 540,302 275,588=53% 168,475=32% 57,650=11% 
2009 581,168 310,611=55% 180,055=32% 53,601=10% 
2010 601,285 315,083=54% 189,326=33% 54,810=9% 
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2011 685,724 350,743=53% 223,740=34% 61,805=9% 
2012 532,911 284,229=55% 165,140=32% 50,366=10% 
2013 191,558 104,958=56% 55,191=29% 20,877=11% 
2014 46,235 24,777=55% 12,662=29% 5,536=12% 
2015, First 
2 Quarters* 
13,604 7,158=54% 3,944=29% 1,541=12% 
Average 367,231 54.2% 31.2% 10.8% 
*Racial breakdowns of “stop and frisk” statistics were not collected before 2003. 
 
As of 2010, the the population of New York City was 8,175,133 denizens.97 Of 
that population, 33.3% identified as “White non-Hispanic,” 22.8% as “Black/African 
American non-Hispanic,” and 28.6% as of “Hispanic Origin.” Despite the relatively close 
margins between these demographics, the data show that white men and women are 
grossly underrepresented in stop-and-frisk statistics as compared to their overall 
representation in the population, constituting an average of just 11% of all stops 
performed each year. Latino men and women constitute, on average, one third of the 
annual stop rate, a statistic which is just slightly higher than their overall representation in 
the city’s population, while black men and women consistently make up more than half 
of all stops conducted each year by the NYPD. Taken together, the black and Latino 
demographics make up the vast majority of the annual stop rate. A report issued by the 
RAND Corporation and supported by the New York City Police Foundation found that in 
                                                 
97 United States Census Bureau. 2010 was the last year for which the USCB published 
population data for New York City. 
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2006, “89 percent of the stops involved nonwhites. Fifty-three percent of the stops 
involved black suspects, 29 percent Hispanic, 11 percent white, and 3 percent Asian.”98  
Opponents of stop-and-frisk point to these statistics as evidence of racial bias 
while supporters maintain that racial disparities can be explained by a necessary targeting 
of certain neighborhoods and demographics. In other words, the policy’s advocates argue 
that, because certain racial or ethnic groups are more often the victims and perpetrators of 
crimes, they are likely to see more stops. Indeed, NYPD representatives have conceded 
that stop-and-frisk operates with intent to target specific demographics. As Former Police 
Commissioner Kelly explained: 
[t]he statistics reinforce what crime numbers have shown for decades: that blacks 
in this city were disproportionately the victims of violent crime, followed by 
Hispanics. Their assailants were disproportionately black and Hispanic too… 
[The NYPD] must continue to fight crime where it finds it, and use those tactics 
that have proven successful.99 
 
However, a report issued by the RAND Corporation and supported by the New York City 
Police Foundation found: 
…when frisked, white suspects were 70 percent likelier than black suspects to 
have had a weapon on them…Officers recovered contraband (such as weapons, 
illegal drugs, or stolen property) in 6.4 percent of the stops of white suspects. The 
contraband recovery rate was 5.7 percent for similarly situated black suspects and 
5.4 percent for similarly situated Hispanic suspects.100 
 
In light of this information, the reasoning behind excusing racial disparities in stops is 
clearly unfounded. The depiction of an increase in criminality in minority groups in terms 
of possession of firearms (the stop-and-frisk policy’s main focus) is not supported by 
                                                 
98 Ridgeway, Greg. “Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police Department’s 
Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices.” Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2007. Web. 
This report can be found on the NYPD website. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ridgeway, G. op.cit. xi. 
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evidence. This suggests that the NYPD is not targeting communities of color with the 
intent of ensuring their safety, but, rather, is using the policy to create a perception of 
criminality in these communities.   
 This seemingly racist intent is supported by the fact that both the arrest rate and 
contraband-recovery rates of stop-and-frisk are most effective in terms of minor drug 
offenses. In fact, most arrests made as a result of stop-and-frisk are based on the 
possession of marijuana, not firearms. For example, in 2012, the ACLU of New York 
reported that “the NYPD recorded more than 26,000 stops for suspected marijuana-
possession offenses.”101 This figure accounts for almost 5% of all stops conducted that 
year. That same year, the NYPD made 21,708 arrests during stops. Of those arrests, 5,307 
were a result of marijuana possession, a figure representing more than a quarter of total 
arrests made via stop-and-frisk.102 Data on marijuana arrests show a huge racial disparity. 
Despite the fact that marijuana use is relatively equal among racial groups,103 of the 
individuals arrested through stop-and-frisk for “suspected marijuana-possession” in 2012, 
61.4% were black, while only 8.7% were white.104 This suggests that, as the ACLU notes, 
“despite the NYPD’s repeated claim that it’s stop-and-frisk program is valuable because 
it targets guns, the facts show that it is much more a marijuana arrest program.”105 
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Cross-City Comparison: 
As noted previously, from January to August of 2015, when compared to the 
same period in 2014, more than 35 cities across the U.S. reported an increase in violent 
crimes, including homicides.106 This cross-city data suggest that the increase in the 
homicide rate observed in New York is part of a larger, national trend rather than being 
unique to New York City or a function of Mayor de Blasio’s repeal of stop-and-frisk. 
What’s more, several cities across the country whose police departments continued to 
employ stop-and-frisk in early 2015 also experienced an increase in the homicide rate 
during that time. 
The issue of stop-and-frisk maintains a high profile in New York City, yet in 
other municipalities, the extent of the policy, or even its existence, appears to be 
intentionally disguised from the public eye. Police departments across the U.S. that use 
stop-and-frisk often refer to it by different names. This deliberate move away from the 
term “stop-and-frisk”—language handed down by the Supreme Court in the Terry 
decision—suggests that the renaming of the policy is an implicit acknowledgement that 
the term has become synonymous with controversy and arbitrary discrimination along 
racial and ethnic lines. For example, in Newark, New Jersey, stops are referred to as 
“field inquiries.”107 In an interview, former Director of the Newark Police Department 
Samuel DeMaio explained the decision to adopt this term saying, “We don’t use stop-
and-frisk…It sounds too invasive.”108 
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In addition to attempting to disguise the policy in less “invasive” language, police 
departments have almost universally refrained from publishing data on stop-and-frisk. In 
2013, after a concerted political effort to demand police transparency, the Newark Police 
Department joined the NYPD as the only other police department publishing stop-and-
frisk data on a monthly basis.109 The call for transparency in Newark was formally 
launched on September 9th, 2010, when the ACLU of New Jersey filed a formal petition 
to the Department of Justice to open an investigation into the NJPD’s policing 
practices.110 The DOJ opened an investigation on May 9th, 2011, citing “allegations of 
use of excessive force” and “discriminatory policing.”111 During the investigation, on 
July 8, 2013, the Newark Police Department issued a general order called the “Police 
Transparency Policy.”112 Under this policy, the Newark Police Department is now 
required to publish statistics every month including the total number of “field inquiries” 
along with detailed information including the “race, gender, age, and limited English 
proficiency” of those stopped.113 
The Newark Police Department waited until the DOJ was two years into their 
investigation to adopt this policy, but the new policy was announced a year before the 
investigation was concluded in July of 2014. The timing of the policy adoption suggests 
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the possibility that Newark Police sought to preempt the political impact of the 
conclusions of the DOJ investigation. The policy shift also occurred, as the ACLU of 
New Jersey pointed out, while controversy continued over New York City’s practice of 
stop-and-frisk.114 Some commentators believe that the controversy surrounding the policy 
in NYC helped prompt the Newark Police Department to release its data. 
 In February, 2014, the ACLU of New Jersey published a report entitled “Stop and 
Frisk: A First Look,” which analyzed the first six months of data made available on “field 
inquiries.” DeMaio’s concern that stop-and-frisk sounded too “invasive” is perhaps valid, 
in that the tactic, as employed by the NJPD, was discovered to be extremely invasive. 
The report found that Newark police officers stop citizens “with troubling frequency,” 
and “make 91 stops per 1,000 residents” as compared to the “8 stops per 1,000 residents” 
made by the NYPD in the same time period.115 The report also found that, as in New 
York, the NJPD “field inquiry” policy is racially discriminatory. It states, “Although 
black Newarkers represent 52 percent of the city’s population, they make up 75 percent 
of all stops.”116 This is probably a skewed statistic in that, as the report notes, the 
department “…did not report data on stops of Latino residents during the six months 
analyzed…meaning that the number of white individuals stopped in the data is likely 
inflated.”117 Possibly as a result of this report, the NPD has not published a report on 
“field inquiries” since December, 2014, violating their own “transparency policy,” and 
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leaving New York City as the only city for which stop-and-frisk data is regularly made 
available.118 
In 2015, the violent crime rate in Newark increased. According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the total number of homicides reported by the NPD was 93 in 
2014.119 As of December 10, 2015, the number of homicides reported by the NPD 
reached 95, surpassing the previous year’s total.120 Given that the NPD is no longer 
publishing their “field inquiries” data, there is no way to compare the annual rate of stops 
to the yearly homicide rate. However, the NPD has made no mention of an effort to 
change the “field inquiries” policy and, as the department’s statistics are not subject for 
review and are therefore free from the possibility of criticism, one can assume that the 
number of “field inquiries” conducted from 2014-2014 did not decrease. Despite the 
continuation of the policy, the homicide rate increased, which would suggest that even if 
the NYPD had maintained a high stop rate, the homicide rate would have still increased. 
The Chicago Police Department employs stop-and-frisk through what they call 
“investigatory stops,” and refers to its law enforcement officers as “peace officers.”121 
Illinois state law describes an investigatory stop as “temporary questioning without 
arrest,” and maintains that “…a peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace 
officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the 
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officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to 
commit, or has committed an offense.”122 The policy is monitored through what’s called 
a “Contact Information System.”123 Police officers of the CPD use “Contact Information 
Cards” to document “investigatory stops” as well as “enforcement of the Gang and 
Narcotics-Related Loitering Ordinances.”124 Information on the cards are then tabulated 
in a Contact Card Database. These cards include “information concerning the individual 
temporarily detained” and “a narrative section used to describe the circumstances of the 
contact.”125 
Unfortunately, Chicago administration and reporting of stop-and-frisk is not as 
clear cut as this. Information in the Contact Card Database is not available for review, 
and the number of “investigatory stops” recorded in the Contact Card Database does not 
reflect the actual number of stops conducted by CPD officers. As the ACLU explains, 
“the CPD does not record stops that lead to arrests or tickets and makes no record of 
frisks.”126 In other words, stops that actually lead to an arrest or the issuance of a ticket 
are not reported as stops. The problems go beyond this, however, as discovered by the 
ACLU of Illinois when it filed a Freedom of Information Act request to “look at the 
nature and number of stop-and-frisks performed by the Chicago Police Department.”127 
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In response to the FOIA request, the CPT consistently dissembled, refused, and otherwise 
resisted releasing data on stop-and-frisk. Initial data released by the CPD was based on 
data collected from June 1, 2012 to August 31, 2012, and from March 1, 2013 to May 31, 
2013.128 However, “prior to April 2014, officers used contact cards to record voluntary 
interactions with civilians, making it difficult to isolate stops and frisks.”129 Given the 
inadequacy of the information released by the CPD, the ACLU “ran a word search of 
terms selected…to identify stops and frisks in that broader database.”130 The search 
showed that, of the six months of data analyzed, the database contained 18,943 contact 
cards which pertained to “investigatory stops.”131 Responding to the ACLU’s request for 
access to the 18,943 contact cards, the CPD’s FOIA office agreed to produce only the 
narrative sections of 300 contact cards, “…asserting there was a burden” on the CPD 
“due to the need to redact personally identifying information from the narratives.”132 The 
ACLU argued that this number was most likely lower than the actual number of stops 
conducted, noting that “[i]t is possible that some records of stops did not contain the 
search terms.”133 
The ACLU’s legal persistence ultimately paid off: as a result of another FOIA 
request, the CPD released information drawn from the Contact Card Database from May 
through August of 2014, with an exclusive focus on “investigatory stops.”134 Analysis of 
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the resultant data showed that, during this time period, the CPD conducted “more than 
250,000 stops that did not lead to an arrest.”135 In March of 2015, the ACLU released a 
report on the six months of data from 2012 and 2013 as well as the four months of data 
from 2014 that found that the “investigatory stop” policy is racially discriminatory. The 
ACLU reported that “Black Chicagoans were subjected to 72% of all stops, yet constitute 
just 32% of the city’s population.”136 
The ACLU report led to an August 7, 2015 “landmark agreement” between the 
CPD, the City of Chicago, and the ACLU. The agreement allows for “an independent 
evaluation of the practices and procedures, and increased transparency and public 
disclosure regarding Chicago police investigatory stops.”137 However, then 
Superintendent of the CPD Garry McCarthy, who served as the Chief of Police of the 
Newark Police Department from 2006-2011 (when the DOJ began its investigation into 
the NPD), clarified CPD’s understanding that the agreement will not “be a change in the 
actual way that we stop people.”138 Rather, “it’s going to be a change in the way that we 
record it.”139 The agreement was not reached until after the first two quarters of 2015, 
when number of homicides recorded by the CPD was 217, an 18.6% increase from the 
same period in 2014, when the number of homicides recorded by the CPD was 183.140 
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Since the agreement was not reached until after the second quarter of 2015, and the CPD 
has maintained that it will not affect the actual practice of “investigatory stops” anyway, 
ceteris paribus the ubiquity of “investigatory stops” from 2014 to 2015 has likely 
remained unchanged, and the increase in the homicide rate cannot be explained by a 
decline in the police tactic of stop-and-frisk by the CPD. 
Conclusion: 
 The historical crime data for New York City and a cross-city comparison of 
contemporary crime statistics show that there is no evidence that the rise in homicide 
rates in New York City in 2015 is a function of the curtailing of the NYPD’s stop-and-
frisk policy. Those who make this claim are making a correlative argument rather than a 
causal argument. This shortsighted conclusion is based on observing and relying on 
specific, isolated data points which show a correlative relationship between the two 
variables—the homicide rate and the rate of stops—and disregard the whole data set 
which disproves the causation entirely. The argument also undermines the possibility that 
other factors could be causing the rise in the violent crime rate. 
 The claim that the spike in the homicide rate is a function of the decrease in stop-
and-frisk is essentially asserting that it is necessary for citizens to forfeit their personal 
freedoms in order to secure our safety as citizens. Moreover, this assumption maintains 
that this violation of individual liberties must be disproportionately applied to 
communities of color in order to secure the safety of the community. This is a tacit, if not 
overt, endorsement of institutionalized racial profiling. The debate over whether or not 
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stop-and-frisk is, in fact, an illegal application of racial discrimination has resulted in a 
legal battle between several legal institutions, citizens, and the city government. 
 On January 31, 2008, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a case against the 
city, Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., claiming that the policy is unconstitutional in 
that the vast majority of stops are conducted without reasonable suspicion and that the 
policy is racially discriminatory.141 The case was filed on behalf of David Floyd and Lalit 
Clarkson, both black men who were subjected to stops by the NYPD.142 On August 12, 
2013, the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York handed down 
a “liability opinion,” which ruled that the policy is unconstitutional.143 The case was 
presided over by United States District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin,144 who wrote a 
lengthy and thorough opinion delineating the unconstitutional nature of the policy. 
Scheindlin’s liability opinion ruled that stop-and-frisk violates the rights of New Yorkers 
protected by both the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 
constitution. 
 The Fourth amendment states that, “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
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things to be seized.”145 In terms of the policy’s bearing on citizens’ Fourth amendment 
rights, Judge Scheindlin ruled that the stop-and-frisk policy violates this right in that a 
large amount of stops are not justified by reasonable suspicion and the vast majority of 
stops do not result in arrest. In her decision, Scheindlin refers to the ruling in the Daniels 
case of 1999, in which “The City agreed to conduct regular audits of whether stops 
recorded on UF-250s were based on reasonable suspicion.”146 Scheindlin writes: 
The NYPD’s senior officials…have received both actual and constructive notice 
since at least 1999 of widespread Fourth Amendment violations occurring as a 
result of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices. Despite this notice, they deliberately 
maintained and even escalated policies and practices that predictably resulted in 
even more widespread Fourth amendment violations…this conclusion is supported 
by the number of UF-250s that do not identify a suspected crime (36% of all forms 
in 2009), the problems inherent in the two most commonly checked stop factors 
(Furtive Movements and High Crime Area), and the fact that only 6% of all stops 
result in an arrest for any crime…Likewise, the pervasiveness of unconstitutional 
frisks was established by the uncontested fact that over half of all people stopped 
are frisked, while only 1.5% of frisks reveal a weapon.147 
 
In other words, the required audits of stops stipulated in the Daniels settlement show that 
a large amount of stops are not based on reasonable suspicion. Additionally, both the 
policy’s low arrest-rate and low contraband recovery rate reveal an unnecessary invasion 
of privacy. 
 In terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that, “No state shall deny…to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” Scheindlin ruled that 
the policy violates this amendment in that its racially discriminatory nature does not 
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provide “equal protection.”148 Scheindlin explains: 
Plaintiffs have established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation of 
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under two theories… First, plaintiffs 
showed that the City, through the NYPD, has a policy of indirect racial profiling 
based on local criminal suspect data. Second, plaintiffs showed that senior officials 
in the City and at the NYPD have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally 
discriminatory application of stop and frisk at the managerial and officer 
levels…The City’s policy of targeting ‘the right people’ for stops clearly violates 
the Equal Protection Clause… 
 
Scheindlin is pointing out that the location-based aspect of the policy, which targets 
communities of color, is essentially an institutionalized form of racial profiling and does 
not qualify as “equal protection” under the law. 
 In addition to her “liability opinion,” Judge Scheindlin handed down a “remedies 
opinion” pertaining to the Floyd case which stipulated a number of reforms the NYPD 
should make to the stop-and-frisk policy. The “remedies opinion” was a joint opinion 
which applied to both Floyd and Ligon v. City of New York, a case filed by the ACLU, 
the Bronx Defenders, The Latino Justice Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, and civil rights attorney Chris Fabricant on March 28, 2012, also citing racial 
discrimination on the part of the NYPD.149 In her second opinion, Scheindlin called for a 
number of reforms including changes to NYPD training practices, changes regarding 
documentation, and the appointment of an independent monitor to oversee these 
reforms.150 The remedies stipulated in Scheindlin’s Floyd decision also applied to a third 
case filed against the city, Davis et al. v. City of New York, et al., which was filed by 
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several residents of the New York City Housing Authority on January 29, 2010, claiming 
that NYCHA, “operating through and in conjunction with the New York City Police 
Department (‘NYPD’), have implemented and continue to conduct, enforce and sanction 
an unlawful vertical patrol and trespass arrest policy which has resulted in a pattern and 
practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents.” 
 Both of Judge Scheindlin’s rulings, which “issued a permanent injunction against 
unconstitutional encounters” and mandated NYPD reforms, did not hold.151 The City of 
New York filed a motion to stay Judge Scheindlin’s appeal and, on October 31, 2013 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit voted to stay Judge Scheindlin’s ruling. The 
stay “render[ed] the lower court’s ruling of violations inoperative until the appeal is ruled 
on by another judge and halt[ed] implementation of any remedies ordered by the 
court.”152 The ruling also removed Judge Scheindlin from all three stop-and-frisk cases, 
claiming that Scheindlin “ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges by 
taking the Floyd and Ligon cases as ‘related’ to a previous case, Daniels, that was before 
her.”153 Additionally, the Court found that “…the judge had given a series of media 
interviews and public statements while the Floyd trial was ongoing,” and found that “the 
judge’s ‘appearance of impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’”154 On January 30, 
2014, the City reached an agreement with the plaintiffs and dropped its appeal “in 
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exchange for placing a three-year time limit on the court-appointed monitor.”155 The 
Davis case was settled on January 7, 2015, under the agreement that the case would 
“become part of the court monitoring process” in Floyd.156 
 Scheindlin’s ruling highlights the fact that, whether or not the policy is effective, 
it is simply illegal. By relying on stop-and-frisk, the NYPD has attempted to solve a 
chronic problem by (ineffectually) treating its symptoms without addressing its causes. 
Proponents of the policy are oblivious to the underlying social problems which contribute 
to certain geographical areas being subject to higher rates of crime. A more cynical 
interpretation of this would be that, rather than ignorance, support for the policy stems 
from a desire to perpetuate these underlying social problems. 
This interpretation is supported by the statements of Director Comey in his 
previously mentioned speech. Comey, who served as the Deputy Chief of the Criminal 
Division in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York from 1987-
1993, addressed the dramatic reduction in violent crime in NYC during that period. 
Comey noted, “Many in law enforcement in New York City—where I worked then—
believed we were destined to have a structural level of violence of more than 2,000 
murders each year,” (Referring to the 2,245 homicides reported in 1990).157 He goes on, 
“That was so wrong…Last year, 328 people were murdered in New York…a number that 
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was unimaginable 25 years ago.”158 (The actual figure is 333). While not directly using 
the term “stop-and-frisk,” he is celebrating its successes. Comey explains, “Like so many 
in law enforcement in the 1980s and 1990s, we worked hard to try to save lives…in those 
black neighborhoods—by rooting out the drug dealers, the predators, the gang bangers, 
the killers.”159 He then acknowledges and defends the intentional racial targeting of the 
policy, which he oversaw in Richmond, Virginia as the Managing Assistant for the U. S. 
Attorney for the Eastern District. He explains: 
As we did that work, I remember being asked why we were doing so much 
prosecuting in black neighborhoods and locking up so many black men. After all, 
Richmond was surrounded by areas with largely white populations. Surely there 
were drug dealers in the suburbs. My answer was simple: We are there in those 
neighborhoods because that’s where people are dying. These are the guys we lock 
up because they are the predators choking off the life of a community. We did this 
because we believed that all lives matter, especially the most vulnerable.160 
 
Comey is asserting that the targeting of specific neighborhoods and demographics is 
necessary in order to secure a community’s safety in that, “young men of color have long 
been dramatically over-represented among both homicide victims and killers.”161 He 
acknowledges that this “over-representation” is a function of larger societal problems. He 
explains, “Each arrest and each prosecution represented a failure on multiple levels of 
society, and there are many reasons for those failures, stretching back many, many 
years—frankly, all the way back to the beginning of this country and even before that.”162 
However, rather than asserting that the solution would be to focus on solving the 
underlying societal problems, Comey upholds the policy a necessary evil. He then uses 
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this claim to justify the larger assertion that the intentional mass incarceration of brown 
and black men simply isn’t true. He explains: 
Nobody ‘disappeared’ from Richmond or New York…in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Instead, case by case, bad guys were arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and 
sentenced…they were removed from their neighborhoods to state and federal 
prisons, where they received the protections of the Constitution and where family 
and friends could visit them…And it didn’t happen ‘en masse.’ Each drug dealer, 
each mugger, each killer, and each felon with a gun had his own lawyer, his own 
case, his own time before judge and jury, his own sentencing, and, in many cases, 
an appeal or other post-sentencing review. There were thousands and thousands of 
those individual cases, but to speak of ‘mass incarceration’ I believe is confusing, 
and it distorts an important reality.163 
 
He concludes, “Yes, we put a whole lot of people in jail, but over that same period, our 
cities were transformed.”164 
President Obama directly addressed this misinterpretation in his speech. Like 
Comey, he acknowledges the general decline in violent crime over the past two decades. 
He asserts, “Over the last 20 years, police have helped cut the violent crime rate and the 
homicide rate in America by almost half.”165  However, while he applauds the decline in 
the overall violent crime rate, he reminds us, “That doesn’t…mean that we shouldn’t 
have a serious and robust debate over fairness in law enforcement, over our broader 
criminal justice system when it comes particularly to communities of color.”166 He then 
goes on to refute Comey’s claim that the targeting of communities of color is an 
unfortunate necessity. Obama counters: 
Things have been working and so a lot of folks say, ‘What’s the problem?’ But 
for generations, we’ve had African-American and Latino communities who have 
pointed to racial disparities in the application of criminal justice, from arrest rates 
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to sentencing to incarceration rates. And all too often these concerns, no matter 
how well documented, have been brushed aside. And we can’t have a situation in 
which a big chunk of the population feels like maybe the system isn’t working as 
well for them. At the same time, too often law enforcement gets scapegoated for 
the broader failures of our society and our criminal justice system…we can’t 
expect [police officers] to contain and control problems that the rest of us aren’t 
willing to face or do anything about—problems ranging from substandard 
education to a shortage of jobs and opportunity, an absence of drug treatment 
programs, and laws that result in it being easier in too many neighborhoods for a 
young person to purchase a gun than a book.167 
 
When Obama refers to “substandard education,” “a shortage of jobs and opportunity,” 
“an absence of drug treatment programs,” and the ease with which people can buy guns 
in this country, he is referring to the underlying societal problems which result in crime 
rates being higher in communities of color. Unlike Comey, who seems to look at these 
underlying problems as too-deeply rooted to change, Obama suggests that they must be 
reformed in order to change the nature of criminal justice. 
 President Obama is acknowledging that, by relying on stop-and-frisk and 
location-based policing tactics, police departments are only addressing the symptoms of 
crime without addressing the underlying causes of crime. In essence, the criminal justice 
system is blaming communities of color for the failures of our society as a whole and, 
rather than attempting to correct these failures, law enforcement officials are relying on 
an easier, quicker solution—arresting and incarcerating people of color at extremely high 
rates. If the criminal justice system continues to address crime only on a surface level, 
higher rates of crime will continue to proliferate in communities of color, community-
police relations will only continue to deteriorate, and the general mistrust of police forces 
will increase. In order to effectively reduce violent crime rates and restore a productive 
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relationship between local police forces and the communities they serve, the U.S. 
criminal justice system must reallocate resources to address the underlying causes of high 
crime rates in certain geographical areas. 
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